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ESTONIA AND THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION  
(instead of introduction) 
 
This research publication Discussions on Estonian Economic Policy is already the 
19th annual collection. The full versions of the papers have been published on CD-
ROM, and the collection on paper contains the abstracts of the papers in other 
languages and the chronicles.
1 To ensure the quality, the papers have first been 
anonymously peer-reviewed by Estonian and foreign economists. Since 2001 this 
collection has been published in mutual cooperation by the publishing house 
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag and the Estonian publisher Mattimar OÜ. The aim of 
the papers is to analyse and assess the current economic developments in the 
European Union and to draw conclusions from them from the aspects of economic 
policy and also concerning the main elements of the political order, if appropriate. 
This has acquired particular importance in the period after the global financial and 
economic crisis. 
 
From 1 January 2011, Estonia has been the 17th EU Member State to adopt euro as 
its national currency. Estonia had met the euro-accession criteria already years ago 
without any difficulties, apart from the inflation criterion. For instance, the budget 
deficit could be kept constantly under three per cent of the gross domestic product 
(GDP). Besides, the national debt before and after transition to euro was 
approximately eight per cent of GDP, being without any doubt the lowest in the 
whole European Union. Also the actions of the Estonian Government during the 
crisis were justified as it did not give in to speculations about the need to devalue the 
Estonian kroon. Considering the relatively low exporting capacity of the Estonian 
economy, it would not have allowed the Estonian kroon to achieve any significant 
expansion effects. On the other hand, Estonian debt obligations to other countries 
would have dramatically increased as more than 90 per cent of foreign loans consist 
in factoring based on euro. Continuing strict adherence to the regulations of the 
currency board system therefore also ensured the fulfilment of the currency 
exchange rate criterion.  
 
The impact of the global financial and economic crisis was particularly severe for 
Estonia. While in 2000–2007 the average GDP growth in real terms was still over 
eight per cent, it decreased by almost 19 per cent in total for 2008 (minus 5.1%) and 
2009 (minus 13.9%). It was the most severe setback among all EU Member States. 
The crisis particularly hit construction activities which accounted for 21% of the 
economy. Such developments led to an increase in unemployment: it increased 3- or 
4-fold in comparison to the 4.7 per cent in 2007. Therefore it is no wonder that 
consumer prices which had increased in 2008 by 10.6 per cent in comparison to the 
previous year, remained almost stable in the next year.
2  
 
                                                                 
1  Either in Estonian, English or German at the author’s choice. 
2 Source: European Commission, Eurostat; from: Informationsdienst des Instituts der deutschen 
Wirtschaft (Köln), 16.12.2010, nr. 50, p 8.   16
The dramatic slow-down of the increase in prices was thus caused by the marked 
deterioration of business prospects. Considering this fact it is very questionable 
whether such a stabilisation trend in the development of prices has a permanent 
nature. The decision to join the euro was based on the Eurostat information 
according to which the price level in Estonia decreased by 0.7 per cent in Estonia 
from April 2009 to March 2010 with which also the inflation criterion of joining 
euro was formally met.  
 
The future will show to what extent the adoption of euro will stimulate the Estonian 
economy. Despite the relatively low volumes of trading in the Tallinn Stock 
Exchange, its developments at least indicate the rapid recovery of the economy. 
After the sharp fall during the economic decline, the main index OMX Tallinn rose 
again last year and namely by the surprisingly high rate of 73 per cent.
3  
 
Joining the euro zone also brings along risks for Estonia which are inherent in the 
system. André Szász who has been a member of the Executive Board of 
Nederlandsche Bank for a long time and has been directly involved for 40 years in 
the various events in the European currency markets, has once mentioned 
sarcastically: „Not one of the politicians who agreed the Maastricht Treaty on the 
introduction of the common currency understood what they were doing.“ This 
statement is surely a little exaggerated but still justified in essence as the basic 
principles for the creation of the European Monetary Union have led to crisis 
situations as recent developments have shown. 
 
According to Jacques Delors, the former President of the European Commission, 
from the very beginning „the main structural error in the monetary union“ was to 
join countries with soft and hard currencies through political will into a common 
currency union. By doing it the parties acknowledged the fact that in quite a few 
countries the benchmark interest rates of the European Central Bank do not conform 
to the actual economic situation. Common interest rates are inevitably too low for 
countries with more rapid development where therefore the trend to higher price 
increases is prevalent. On the other hand, benchmark interest rates are too high for 
countries which have remained stagnant. The interest rates proved to be too low for 
instance in such countries as Spain and Ireland where the too fast development led to 
an economic bubble. Common financial policy was expected to have an impact on 
general developments which can balance such differences. But as experience has 
shown, these expectations were false. Incorrect evaluations led to the appearance of 
more and more trouble spots in the European Union. 
 
Besides, the evaluations proceeded from the assumption that distortions of 
competition, which inevitably appear in the common currency space due to different 
development levels of salary rates, labour productivity and the respective costs, can 
be eliminated only with the functioning of market forces. According to OECD 
statistics, differences in labour costs have led to the situation where, for instance, in 
                                                                 
3 Estland, Lettland und Litauen auf der Überholspur. – Handelsblatt (German economic and 
financial newspaper), 06 January 2011, p. 18.   17
Germany, the production structures reconditioned in the years of lower economic 
growth have enabled businesses to achieve a 10% global competitive edge. At the 
same time the competitiveness of Greece, Portugal and Spain considerably 
decreased. Such differences cause balance surpluses in more advanced countries and 
a balance of trade deficit in less developed countries in the situation of common 
currency exchange rates. The belief that self-healing forces level the flaws in 
competitiveness without any problems and that deficits can be financed turned out to 
be another illusion.  
 
The financial and economic crisis has made many traditional basic principles of 
national economy sound absurd, particularly the neoclassical/monetarist 
assumptions about the functioning principles of free markets,
4 stable balancing 
factors and unerringly rationally operating economic subjects, also the opinion that 
state intervention causes more damage than it brings benefit. Developments in the 
recent years have demonstrated, however, that without adequate state regulation, the 
human desire to reap maximum benefit will lead to catastrophic crises. Bearing that 
fact in mind, we should recall the basic truths of the so-called “new economics”
5 and 
define the role of the state in the new light. 
 
Experience teaches us that abnormal developments in national economy have been 
closely related to non-functioning capital markets. Measures for overcoming the 
crisis which are limited only – although no doubt urgently necessary – reforming of 
money markets and capital markets
6, will only have a short-term effect. It is not 
enough to have Brussels so-to-say „give its blessing“ to draft state budgets of EU 
Member States in the future, i.e. start controlling budget deficits and monitoring 
their reduction to allowed limits. Insufficient coordination of national economic 
policies in such an economic space as the euro zone will inevitably lead to 
destabilisation of real economies. In order to avoid such gaps between the economic 
development levels of EU Member States as in the recent years, also tax policy, 
employment policy and social policy should be removed from the discretion of each 
member state and transferred to the higher authorities in addition to central financial 
policy – analogously with the European Central Bank. 
 
This research publication consists of two parts in 2011 – the first issue is published 
in June and the second issue in autumn. Hopefully it will be so also in the future. 
The first issue includes also the names of authors and titles of papers that will be 
                                                                 
4 I.e. „through the invisible hand of the market“ (Adam Smith). Joseph Stiglitz, on the other 
hand, states: „the reason that the invisible hand often seems invisible is that it is often not 
there.“  
5 1930s; cf.: Skidelsky, R. Die Rückkehr des Meisters – Keynes für das 21. Jahrhundert. 
München: Verlag Antje Kunstmann, 2010. 
6 Cf.: Eesti majanduspoliitilised väitlused – 18/ Estnische Gespräche über Wirtschaftspolitik – 
18/ Discussions on Estonian Economic Policy – 18. Berlin, Tallinn: BWV, Mattimar, 2010, 
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published in the second issue in autumn.
7 The publication „Eesti majandus-
poliitilised väitlused“ (Discussions on Estonian Economic Policy) has been 
registered with the international ISBN (International Standard Book Number)
8 and 
ISSN (International Standard Serial Number)
9 systems and with ETIS (Estonian 
Research Information System) under the research results classification numbers 
1.2
10 and 3.1.
11 
 
Since 2001 the publication has been registered also with ISBN in Germany. 
Discussions on Estonian Economic Policy (with papers in English, German and 
Estonian) has been represented in the Federal Republic of Germany, in the ECONIS 
Database of the German National Library of Economics ((Deutsche 
Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften – ZBW) of one of the best-known 
economic research organisations among economic communities, the Institute for 
World Economy (IfW-Kiel) of the University of Kiel
12 and in the EBSCO Database 
Central & Eastern European Academic Source (CEEAS) of Massachusetts, USA.
13  
 
We are currently making efforts to increase the international distribution even more 
and to be represented in additional recognised databases. 
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7 As there will be a considerable time interval between the publishing of the first and the 
second issue, there may be certain changes in the second issue due to circumstances related to 
the author, peer review, editing, etc. 
8 ISBN is an international 13-digit standard code, identifier of a book, etc., including 
periodicals with unique titles, electronic publications (e.g. CD-ROMs), etc. 
9ISSN is an international standard code, unique eight-digit identifier of a periodical publication. 
10 Number 1.2 – Peer-reviewed articles in other international research journals with an ISSN 
code and international editorial board, which are circulated internationally and open to 
international contributions. 
11 Number 3.1 – Articles/chapters in books published by the publishers recognised by ETIS. 
12 www.zbw-kiel.de 
13 http://www.ebscohost.com/thisTopic.php?marketID=1&topicID=1284, in the list of 
academic publications http://www.ebscohost.com/titleLists/e5h-coverage.pdf  